Honesty Based Democratic Scheme to Improve Community Cooperation for IoT
  Based Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks by Rehman, Ghani ur et al.
Received: Added at production Revised: Added at production Accepted: Added at production
DOI: xxx/xxxx
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Honesty Based Democratic Scheme to Improve Community
Cooperation for IoT Based Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks
Ghani ur Rehman1,2 | Anwar Ghani*1 | Muhammad Zubair2 | Shahbaz Ahmad Khan
Ghayyure1 | Shad Muhammad1
1Department of Computer Science &
Software Engineering, International Islamic
University, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan
2Faculty of Computer Science &
Bioinformatics, Khushal Khan Khattak
University, Karak 27000, Pakistan
Correspondence
*Dr. Anwar Ghani, Department of Computer
Science & Software Engineering,
International Islamic University Islamabad,
Email: anwar.ghani@iiu.edu.pk
Present Address
Department of Computer Science &
Software Engineering, International Islamic
University Islamabad
Summary
Many Internet of things (IoT) applications have been developed and implemented on
unreliable wireless networks like the Delay tolerant network (DTN), however, effi-
cient data transfer in DTN is still an important issue for the IoT applications. One of
the application areas of DTN is Vehicular Delay Tolerant Network (VDTN) where
the network faces communication disruption due to lack of end-to-end relay route. It
is challenging as some of the nodes show selfish behavior to preserve their resources
like memory, and energy level and become non-cooperative. In this article, an Hon-
esty based Democratic Scheme (HBDS) is introduced where vehicles with higher
honesty level are elected as heads – during the process. Vehicles involved in the
process would maximize their rewards (reputation) through active participation in
the network activities whereas nodes with non-cooperative selfish behavior are pun-
ished. The honesty level of the heads is analyzed using Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves
(VCG) model. The mathematical model and algorithms developed in the proposed
HBDS technique are simulated using the VDTNSim framework to evaluate their effi-
ciency. The performance results show that the proposed scheme dominates current
schemes in terms of packet delivery probability, packet delivery delay, number of
packets drop, and overhead ratio.
KEYWORDS:
Sustainability, IoT, Revitalization, Smart and connected communities, Social selfishness, Selfish behav-
iors,Incentive techniques
1 INTRODUCTION
Normally the traditional internet is the connectivity of homogeneous devices like computers but there are some emerging
paradigm where Heterogeneous devices like tablets, computers, and smartphones are connected for some specific purposes in a
wireless network like cloud and grid. One of the similar vision paradigms is the Internet of Things (IoT)1. In IoT, the connected
devices are heterogeneous and can be used for sensing, object identification, tracking of vehicles, privacy and traffic control
and many other areas. In such scenarios, the underlying network is very important to consider. The IoT applications may suffer
from low connectivity, mobility of nodes, and interruptions of links in the urban environment. Such unstructured networks in
the urban areas are termed as DTN. DTN 2 has nodes that cooperate to forward messages to its connected node. In the DTN
0Abbreviations: Delay Tolerant Networks, Selfish behavior, Honesty, incentive schemes, Internet of Things, Trustworthiness, cooperative communication
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2 Ghani ET AL
the mobile nodes are intermediate and help in data transfer in the network. There are also connectivity issues in the DTN, so it
used the store and forward routing method3,4. The node in the DTN stores the message until it finds another node to forward
the message. DTN packet forwarding depends on the mobile node performance. Sometimes the mobile nodes are not willing to
forward messages to other nodes in the network5. It can be useful in Interplanetary, the military, and (VDTN).
The paper is about the behavior of node (vehicles) in the vehicular Delay tolerant (VDTNs)6, where the connected vehicles
communicate wirelessly to each other. Many of the applications of the VDTN are traffic congestion notification, updates on
the weather, emails and many others. The traditional routing protocols DSR and AODV may not work properly due to broken
connectivity. The store and carry approach of these traditional routing has some cooperation for forwarding the data to its
destination irrespective of the place. The messages are replicated by the DTN protocols to ensure the end to end connectivity
issue. The selfish nodes can degrade the performance of the DTN network by showing misbehavior towards other nodes in a
network. Some of the research has shown that the misbehaved nodes can badly damage the performance of the network7,8,9.
Other research has shown that the misbehavior is due to selfish nodes in the network. The selfish nodes save its resources
such as (storage space, CPU time, and energy, etc) in order to be chosen10. This clearly indicates that selfishness is the real
issue in the DTN and needs to be addressed in a more sophisticated way. The two types of nodes in the network is normal
and abnormal nodes11. A normal type of nodes in the network actively participates in the network simulation and show its
cooperation with its neighbor nodes. Abnormal nodes are those nodes which are not taking part in the network activities and
can degrade the performance of the network. This selfish behavior of node is shown to save its resources like energy-saving,
bandwidth, manipulation and other social behaviors12.
For the simulation of the selfish nodes in the network, many different mechanisms have been proposed. In the incentive and
punishment-based scheme13, nodes in the network get incentives based on cooperation and its weight. In multi-heads clustering
scheme14, the incentive to the nodes is rewarded only on its weight. The drawbacks with these two approaches are that, (i) the
contacts made are only for short duration in IPS Scheme (ii) there is chances of weight tie problem in multi-leader election
scheme. The proposed scheme omits the selfish behavior of the nodes in different way as compared to these techniques like
nodes nomination criteria for the democratic system is based on some honesty parameters. It is observed that when the nodes in
the network have long and frequent conversations, higher level of honesty is expected. The following are the key contribution
in the proposed scheme in VDTN;
• Analyzing node behavior in VDTN.
• To investigate the influence of the activities of the node on network performance and to develop a methodology in which
node with selfish behavior are stimulated and encouraged to cooperate.
• To boost the overall performance of the system on the basis of node honesty with different parameters such as frequency of
interaction, mutuality and centrality and community of interest to elect heads e.g. Community Head, Auxiliary Community
Head and Incentive Head.
• To design a Watchdog system that properly check the behavior of nodes in a community.
• A Comparative review is conducted to compare the performance of the proposed mechanisms with all the other incentive-
based techniques. In addition, the proposed solution has increased network performance in terms of packet delivery
probability, packet dropping ratio, overhead and delivery delay.
Rest of the paper is organized as: Section 2 discusses related work, in Section 3, HBDS detailed design is presented, it also
covers system model. The performance results of HDBS is presented in Section 4. The paper is finally concluded in Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORKS
IoT has greatly influenced the smart cities and helps it in making a sustainable environment in it. The major objectives of smart
and sustainable societies are to provide livability, renewal, and a sustainable environment for human life15. Smart and sustainable
cities are connected by heterogeneous devices like computers, traffic lights, roadside units, healthcare units, and smart homes.
One of the important aspects of smart and connected cities16,17 is to make societies sustainable. The connected objects in
such types of societies are to provide a resource-efficient environment, ensure safety, healthy living-hood, and provide a smart
transport system18,19. The IoT applications in the smart transport system depend on the VDTN paradigm of networking20.
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In VDTN, the vehicles are connected with roadside units, lights, and other vehicles. For IoT applications to work in VDTN
efficiently the connected objects need to be cooperative and forward data within a network21. However, some of the nodes in the
VDTN have selfish behavior. Many researchers have addressed the issue of selfishness in it. The selfish behavior of the nodes
degrades the performance of the network22,23. Incentive-based mechanisms encourage the selfish nodes to simulate and share
its resources for cooperation in the network24. Incentive schemes are credit-based, reputation-based, game-theory and barter
systems. All the cooperative nodes are rewarded for showing cooperation by the credit-based approach in the network. This
reward will be used by the nodes in the network for their purpose later on in the election process.
Jiang et al.25 have designed a secure credit-based incentive scheme (SCIS)to encourage the selfishness nodes for cooperation in
opportunistic networks. The selfish nodes are given some sort of incentive in the form of virtual credit for their cooperation. Ning
et al.26 proposed a Copy Adjustable Incentive Scheme(CAIS) is a type of mechanism where all the nodes in the community are
divided based on the social interaction in the network. In this scheme, two types of incentive namely social and non-social credits
are given to the nodes. Park et al.27 have proposed a bitcoin-based secure incentive scheme to motivate nodes for cooperation in
VDTN. Bitcoin is a very popular currency and digital payment based some techniques of cryptography. Jiang et al.28 proposed a
credit-based congestion-aware incentive scheme (CBCAIS) to handle the issue of selfishness in DTN. Nodes are given credit for
their cooperation. The selfish nodes are punished for not showing cooperation in the network. Jedari et al.29 proposed a game-
theoretic incentive scheme for social-aware routing in selfish mobile social networks (GISSO) to stimulate the selfish nodes for
cooperation.
The reputation-based incentives scheme calculates the nodes cooperation in the network. Cooperative nodes in the network
have higher values than the selfish and non cooperative nodes. Rehman et al.13 proposed an incentive and punishment scheme
for to discuss the issue of selfishness. In this scheme on one hand nodes are given an incentive in the form of a reputation for their
cooperation within the community. On the other hands, nodes are punished for showing selfish behavior repeatedly in the form
of expulsion from the community. The problem of selfishness in Vehicle Delay Tolerant Network is presented in Dias et al.30.
In this approach, the score for a successful transfer of data is calculated. If packets are received successfully, the score will be
increased; otherwise, a certain number will decrease the score. Mantas et al.31 proposed a reputation-based scheme to handled
the issue of selfishness. In this scheme monitor nodes are used to properly monitor the behaviors of the nodes in the network and
nodes are encouraged for cooperation. Jedari et al.32 proposed So-Watch (Social Watchdog system) uses a reputation scheme
that identifies the number of selfish nodes and the level of selfishness. Kou et al.33 proposed a strict reward and punishment
model to tackled the issue of selfishness. Nodes are stimulated for taking part in the routing process. Sharma et al.34 proposed a
reputation-based scheme to detect selfish and malicious nodes and also stimulates such nodes for cooperation in Delay tolerant
networks. Cai et al.35 have presented an efficient incentive-compatible routing protocol (ICRP) for DTNs. In this scheme nodes
are rewarded incentives in the shape of a reputation for showing cooperation.
In barter system, the nodes in contact share same amount of information which is also called tit-for-tat scheme. Liu et al.36
proposed that message can be forwarded between the communities and the nodes based on the barter-based mechanism. The
nodes and the community in the network share the messages. The messages are shared between node and community. Zhou et
al.37 that Tit-for-Tit scheme for the message forwarding in the network. In this scheme a reward is given to the cooperative nodes
for forwarding of data to the other nodes. Buttyan et al.38 proposed a barter-based approach to deal with issue of selfishness.
Some other approaches such as game-theoretic, social and trust-based have also been proposed to deal with the issue of
selfishness. SSAR39 is a social-based scheme that tackled the problem of selfishness in a network. In this approach, a node
having a strong social relationship in a community can take part in data forwarding for other nodes. Lui et al.40 proposed an
incentive scheme to share information that is related to a road accident, road construction and delay in traffic, etc. Fawaz et
al.41 proposed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) scheme to encourage vehicles for cooperation. Li et al.42 proposed a scheme
which also stimulates vehicles for cooperation in a vehicle to vehicle networks. Socievole et al.43 proposed a social approach to
encourage selfish and misbehavior nodes for cooperation. Umar et al.44 proposed a game-theoretic scheme that motivates the
nodes for cooperation to reduces the load on nodes. Vamsi et al45 proposed a trust-aware scheme to stimulate the nodes to take
part in the routing process. Kumar et al.46 has proposed a dynamic trust-based intrusion detection scheme track and isolate the
selfish nodes from the network. Pal et al.47 proposed a trust-based approach for ensuring the routing process. Dhurandher et
al.48 proposed a trust-based scheme that motivates the nodes for cooperation in the network.
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3 PROPOSED SCHEME HBDS
The prime focus of the proposed scheme HBDS is to investigate the involvement of node in DTN network. The nodes in the
network are responsible for message forwarding andwatching over its fellow nodes. These two activities are main responsibilities
of the nodes in the democratic process. Nodes are encouraged to participate in the network and coordinate to make better
performance of the network. In a community based network the node watches the fellow node behavior for sending and receiving
messages. This gives controls to the node over message forwarding in a network. The proposed mechanism suggests incentives
to the nodes in the form of reputation to motivate the nodes for simulation and to improve the performance of the network. The
proposedmechanismwill show us the involvement of the nodes in the network and its contribution towards network performance.
The contribution of the node is from message forwarding to the watching of the fellow nodes for the message forwarding.
The proposed mechanism makes incentive to the nodes for a) involvement of the node in the Democratic process b) Messages
forwarding to its fellow nodes c) Watching the behavior of the other nodes. These will be explained in later sections. The nodes
with selfish behavior in the network are simulated and encouraged to participate in the democratic process to cooperate in the
networks. The node with persistent selfish behavior are punished and may be expelled from the community and this message
will be broadcasted in the community. The registration of the nodes in the VDTN will be decided by centralized authority.
Registration process depends on three parameters, per-node budget, payment to the relay node, and the payment made to the
watchdog. The working of the proposed scheme presented in the figure 1.
Selfish Behavior Cooperative
a. Frequecy of Interactions   
Operations of  Elected Heads
b. Mutuality and Centrality    
c. Community of Interests
Election Completed
Demoratic Process
Watchdog Nodes
Punishment IncentiveDemocratic Process Begin
Election 
Table
Community Incentive 
 Head
ACH
Head
Eligibility (Honesty)
Nodes  Nominated  for 
Election based on 
Honeaty Level
FIGURE 1 Overall Structure of Proposed Scheme
3.1 Incentive for Participation in Democratic Process
The proposed HBDS scheme forwards the data to other nodes in the community. The nodes in the network start the democratic
process by participating in the election. Some of the topics like community formation and its maintenance can nor be covered
in this paper and therefore it is not discussed here.
3.1.1 Democratic Process
The democratic process periodically manages the community. The eligibility criterion of the democratic process is trust attribute
(TA) honesty of the node. It plays an important role in the assessment of the trust developed among the nodes in the network.
Without honesty the trust among the nodes will not be genuine and strong relationships cannot exist as in the sociology concept.
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Trust attribute (TA) shows the trustiness of the vehicle with the trustor vehicle49. The honesty property of the trust is chosen
because dishonest nodes can make delays in the network and can obstruct the overall operations of the network delivery. Hon-
est nodes will be nominated for the election process. The three factors for the node honesty calculation are (a) Frequency of
interaction (b) Mutuality and Centrality and (c) Community of interest. The node that scores the highest number of votes for
honesty will be elected as community head 퐶퐻 . Second, highest sorcerer will be elected as auxiliary community head 퐴퐶퐻
and the third-highest scorer will become Incentive head 퐼퐻 . To bring stability to the community, the 퐴퐶퐻 can become 퐶퐻 if
the community head moves away from the community and is not part of the community anymore. Heads in the community are
responsible for assigning unique community-id. After every democratic process, the 퐶퐻 uses MAC-id to generate community-
ids to the nodes in the community. The unique community-ids are stored and maintained by the succeeding퐴퐶퐻 . The incentive
head 퐼퐻 makes payment to the cooperative nodes in the form of incentives. The watchdog nodes are used to monitors the
behavior of the nodes and are selected by the heads in the network. Honesty calculation is a lengthy process. It combines past
information with the new information to predict the honesty level of the node. The honesty level depends on the frequency of
conversations and the length of the conversation in the connected nodes. The cooperation of a node can also be judged by the
balanced of interactions among the nodes. 퐻푎푥푦(푡) provides the evaluation of honest to object 푦 by object 푥 at time 푡, where 푎represents the attributes. The calculation of node honesty is explained as follow:
Frequency of Interaction:
Let us consider a conversations between nodes 퐶 = {푐1, 푐2, , 푐3,∨̀‥∨̀‥, 푐푛}, the conversation between trustee nodes over time
t. On the basis of this, the degree of honesty between two nodes can be calculated in equation 1.
퐻표푛푒푠푡푦푇퐶푥푦 (푡) =
푗∑
푖=1
∣ 푐푙푖 ∣
∣ 푡푐푙푖 ∣
퐸(푐푙푖) (1)
where 푗 is the number of contacts made, means the frequency of interactions of a node with each other, 푐푙푖 is the length of
the 푖푡ℎ successful communication. 푡푐푙푖 is the overall length of communication and 퐸(푐푙푖) will measure the usefulness of the
conversation and is called the entropy function.
Mutuality and Centrality:
Common friends of two nodes show the honesty of the trustor and trustee. More common friends between the nodes mean higher
reliability of communication between them. We can calculate the mutuality and centrality (credibility) of the trustee node and
is given in equation 2.
퐻표푛푒푠푡푦푐푒푛푥푦 (푡) =
∣∣푀푥푦 ∣∣
∣∣ 푁푥 ∣∣
(2)
where푀푥푦 is the number of common friends between two nodes and푁푥 is the trustee friends.
Community of Interest:
We know that both the trustor and the trustee can be members of more than one community. One of the important factors in
honesty is to see howmuch interest a node takes in a community. It also shows the common capabilities of nodes in a community.
Here푀푥푦 shows the common communities of the trustor and the trustee nodes and푁푥푦 shows the communities of which trustee
is a member is shown in equation 3.
퐻표푛푒푠푡푦푐표푖푥푦 (푡) =
∣∣푀 푐표푖푥푦 ∣∣
∣∣ 푁 푐표푖푥 ∣∣
(3)
Once the values are calculated for all three parameters, then the final honesty degree of a trustee is given in equation 4.
퐹퐻푥푦(푡) = 훼1퐻표푛푒푠푡푦푇퐶푥푦 (푡) + 훼2퐻표푛푒푠푡푦
푐푒푛
푥푦 (푡) + 훼3퐻표푛푒푠푡푦
푐표푖
푥푦 (푡) (4)
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Algorithm 1 Democratic Process and Incentive algorithm
Require: Number of nodes 푛
Ensure: Democratic Process and Incentive to nodes participating in the Democratic process
1: for 푥 = 1 ∶ 푛 do
2: Compute and broadcast 퐹퐻푥
3: end for
4: for all 푘 ∈ 푛 do
5: Nominate node 푚푎푥(퐹퐻푘) for election
6: end for
7: Votes are counted and nodes such as 퐶퐻 , 퐴퐶퐻 and 퐼퐻 elected in democratic Process
8: 푃푎푦 = ∑푘∈푛(푉 푡푥(퐹퐻, 푘)).퐹 푏.훽푥 and 퐶표푠푡푥 = 1퐹퐻푥 ∗ (퐹퐻푦 − 퐹퐻푥)∑푘∈푛(푉 푡푥(퐹퐻, 푘))퐹푏.훽푥9: 퐶퐻 new reputation, 푅푒푝퐶퐻 = 푅푒푝퐶퐻 + 푃푎푦퐶퐻 − 퐶표푠푡퐶퐻
10: for all 푘, 푘 is not CH in community do
11: new reputation 푅푒푝푘 = 푅푒푝푘 + 푃푎푦푘
12: end for
13: for all 푘 ∈ 푛 do
14: broadcast 퐶퐻푎푐푘=푉 푡퐶퐻 (푘) ∥ 푃푎푦푘 ∥ 푅푒푝푘
15: end for
16: Update Election Table
where 퐹퐻 is the final honesty, the (훼1, 훼2, 훼3) are selected randomly, where the total honesty is equal to 1. Algorithm 1 has
detail about the democratic process in the proposed scheme.
In this algorithm, honesty of all nodes are calculated and then broadcasted in the community. The nodes are nominated for
democratic process on the basis of honesty and then incentive is given to all the nodes participating in the democratic process.
The running complexity of the algorithm is 푂(푛푘).
A node in the community with a higher honesty level is considered as a candidate for the democratic process of election.
The node sometime can declare itself as honest and report false information. The false report will be either declaring itself as
dishonest or over an honest node. To escape the chances of becoming community head the node declares itself under honest
and it may declare itself over honest to get some incentives to become community head. The trust behavior of the nodes in a
community will be evaluated by VCG model. To know about the false information reported by the nodes, VCG model is used.
3.1.2 Vickrey, Clarke and Groves (VCG) Scheme
Vickrey Clarke and Groves is an important and valuable method of game theory. It predicts the nodes behavior in the network
and motivates the dishonest nodes to participate in the network50. It was previously assumed that energy level and weight of the
node as internal and private information of the node. So the truth-telling behavior of the VCGwas used to predict the behavior of
the node51. In our proposed model, some of the parameters of the nodes declare the honesty of the respective node. The honesty
level of the node is considered as internal and private information. The mobility parameters of the node show the honesty level
of the node in VDTN. The reputation of the node reaches to certain level after every democratic process. The reputation of the
node s calculated on the basis of cooperation of the node in the network. The payment procedure detail is given in Algorithm 2.
In this algorithmwatchdog nodes are collectively selected by the three heads. The watchdog nodes are responsible for monitor-
ing the behavior of all nodes in the network. The importance aspect of all watchdog nodes are calculated. The overall operations
and responsibilities of the elected heads and payment detail is also given in the algorithm. The complexity of the algorithm is
푂(푛).
3.1.3 Payment after Democratic Process using VCG Model
The game has 푛 number of players. We consider each node to be a community player. The democratic process starts with nodes
disclosing their honesty level. Democratic election process is used for nodes election as heads and declared others as participants.
The heads elected through the democratic process and other participants will receive payments in the form of reputation. Nodes
in the network are always in search to increase its reputation value 푅. the higher the value of 푅 the more services they receive
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Algorithm 2 Responsibilities of Elected Heads and Incentive for packet forwarding algorithm
Require: Number of nodes 푛
Ensure: Operations of Elected Heads& Incentive to nodes for Packet Forwarding
1: for 푥 = 1 ∶ 푛 do
2: for each relay in community
3: Elected Heads collectively assign Watchdog nodes WN1, WN2 and WN3
4: 푊푁푖, {푖 = 1, 2, 3}, wait for time âĂŸtâĂŹ
5: if The same packet overheard after time âĂŸtâĂŹ then
6: beh = Coop;
7: send 푡(푟푒푝표푟푡) =′ 퐶표표푝′
8: else
9: beh = Self;
10: send 푡(푟푒푝표푟푡) =′ 푆푒푙푓 ′
11: end if
12: 퐶퐻 compute 퐼퐴
13: 퐼퐴푥 =
푅푥
Σ3푥=1푅푥14: 퐶퐻 Calculate the behavior of all nodes푊푁푖
15: if 푥푐표표푝 > 푥푠푒푙푓 then
16: grant 푃푎푦푟 = 푅푒푝푟 + 퐹푝푎푦
17: else
18: grant 푃푎푦푟 = 푅푒푝푟 − 퐹푝푎푦
19: end if
20: if 푡푟푒푝표푟푡(푊푁푖) = 푡푓푖푛푎푙 then
21: grant 푃푎푦푊푁푖 = 푅푒푝푊푁푖 + 푃푎푦(푊푁)
22: else
23: grant 푃푎푦푊푁푖 = 푅푒푝푊푁푖 − 푃푎푦(푊푁)
24: update 푅푇 푎푏푙푒
25: end if
26: end for
from the network. Each node in the network has 푅푇푎푏푙푒 to maintain its reputation. The node updates its 푅푡푎푏푙푒 when the node
gets updates from neighbor node.
Payment to Elected head (퐶퐻) of Community
Each node gets payment after the democratic process ends. The 퐶퐻 gets payment on the basis of a number of votes it receives
from the participants nodes. the nodes participating in the democratic process also get payments for voting, which denote the
cost of the elected 퐶퐻 .퐻1,퐻2, ....,퐻푛, where 푛 is all number of nodes, represents the cost vector (nodes honesty). Difference
in the value of payment to the node and payment received is the gain of 퐶퐻 is given in equation 5.
푃푎푦 =
∑
푘∈푛
(푉 푡푥(퐹퐻, 푘)).퐹 푏.훽푥 (5)
where 푉 푡푥(퐹퐻, 푘) provides certain values in the democratic process (value is 1 if 푘 node votes for 푥, otherwise 0 will be
produced. 퐶퐻 also assigns a fixed budget 퐹퐵 to every node participating in the democratic process. This fixed budget is known
to all the nodes in the network. 훽푥 is a payment of node shown below in equation 6.
훽푥 = 퐹퐻푥 +
1∑
푘∈푛 푉 푡푥(퐹퐻, 푘)
×
∑
푙∈푛
(퐹퐻푦) ×
∑
푘∈푛
푉 푡푦(퐹퐻|퐹퐻푥 = ∞, 푘) −∑
푦∈푛
(퐹퐻푦)
∑
푘∈푛
(푉 푡푦(퐹퐻,퐾)) (6)
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TABLE 1 Summary of notations and symbols
Notation Representation of the symbol
푥 퐶퐻 is the Community Head that is elected in Democratic Process
푐푙푖 Lenght of 푖푡ℎ successful communication
푡푐푙푖 Overall length of communication
퐸(푐푙푖 Entropy Function
푅푒푝푥 Node 푚 reputation
푃푎푦푥 Node 푥 payment
푉 푡푥 Node 푘 which voted for 푥
훽푥 Per member node cost
퐻푥 Honesty level of node 푥
퐼퐴푥 Importance aspect of node 푥
푀푥푦 Number of common friends
푁푥 Trustee Friends
푐표푖 Community of interest
푊푁 Watchdog Node
Payment to Community Members
The total cost of the nodes is divided among them based on the reputation of the node. The 퐶퐻 announces the payment to
the nodes through 퐶퐻푎푐푘 message. All the messages once received are authenticated by the standard message authentication
mechanism. An update is made to the RTable in each node. The fixed payment 퐹퐵 is used to distribute the total cost among the
connected nodes who have participated in the voting process. We can calculate the cost function 퐶푥 determined by 퐶퐻푥 and is
given in equation 7.
퐶표푠푡푥 =
1
퐹퐻푥
∗ (퐹퐻푦 − 퐹퐻푥)
∑
푘∈푛
(푉 푡푥(퐹퐻, 푘))퐹푏.훽푥 (7)
where 퐹퐻푥 and 퐹퐻푦 represent the highest and second-highest nodes honesty of the nodes participating in a democratic process.
As noticed below, the elected heads calculates their reputation by deducting the overall cost form their own payment to calculate
their own reputation and is shown in equation 8.
푅푒푝푥 = 푃푎푦푥 − 퐶표푠푡푥 (8)
Each node gets a share of the total cost based on the reputation of the node. 퐶퐻푎푐푘 message is used to announce the payment to
the nodes in the network. These messages are verified by the standard authentication messages. After each announcement the
node updates its 푅푇푎푏푙푒.
3.2 Packet Forwarding Payment
The gateway nodes(GW) and the community head (CH) cannot be used as a relay node. This restriction means that these nodes
cannot be used to forward packets. This is a negative and selfish behavior of the node and can degrade the performance of the
network. Selfish nodes can make disconnections and drop packets, this selfish behavior has a negative impact on the performance
of the network. To stimulate the nodes for participation in the network, some incentives have been awarded in the form of
reputation. To make the payment system effective, a monitoring system is used to monitors the relay nodes. Table 1 has the
notations used in the proposed scheme.
3.2.1 Incentive for Relay Nodes
The 퐼퐻 makes payment to the nodes for each data forwarding in our proposed scheme. It pays fixed payment (퐹푝푎푦) in the form
of incentives and is managed by incentive head. The 퐹푝푎푦 is allocated to the relay node on the basis of its cooperative behavior.
Ghani ET AL 9
To monitor this a watchdog system is introduced to monitors the behavior of all the relay nodes and then take the behavioral
decisions.
Cumulative Trust of Watchdog Nodes
In Proposed scheme, we have three watchdog nodes in a relay. One of them is auxiliary community Head 퐴퐶퐻 , the second
one is a predecessor to the 퐴퐶퐻 and the third one is selected in round-robin as member node. The nodes in the relay create
hash52, the function of the hash is to keep the packet genuine and prevent the forwarding node from changing the packet. Every
packets when reach to its destination nodes, it is verified with hash function value. If the value of the has function is matching,
it means the packet is in steady-state. If the hash value is not matching then the forwarder node is declared as a selfish node,
and it receives negative payment. The nodes in the network keep a record of the recently forwarded packets in a buffer. Each
packet has a certain expected time to be sent next. So we can calculate direct and indirect trust based on the node behavior.
Direct trust is based on the interaction of the node with its neighbor nodes. There are three watchdog nodes in our proposed
scheme. The watchdog function as monitor to observe the behavior of the neighbor nodes in the network. Any unusual behavior
is reported and trust value is calculated using a hash function. A watchdog system constantly monitors the conversation of the
node with its neighbor node. It calculates the total number of dropped and forwarded packets in a network. The mobility of the
node creates difficulty in calculating the trust value. It is because the node while moving also discover new nodes and replaces
an old neighbor. To overcome this situation, the second opinion is taken to assess the rigorous trust value. So indirect trust is
calculated to improve the overall decision-making system. So each watchdog calculates both direct and indirect trust value for
the total calculation of the trust value. The range value is [0,1] for each watchdog node. The initial value starts at 0.5. Any value
greater than 0.5 is termed as a cooperative node and less than 0.5 is a selfish node.
The trust reported generated by the node is its individual opinion. It can be cooperative or selfish, based on the individual
behavior of the node. The 퐶퐻 calculates the total trust value from three trust reports of the watchdog nodes. If the total value of
the trust is greater than the selfish behavior of the node, the nodes is declared as genuine and incentive in the form of reputation
is made to it. In order to avoid contradiction in the results, the 퐶퐼퐴 cumulative importance aspect rule is introduced to calculate
the trust value from different nodes based on certain evidence.
Cumulative Important Aspect for Trust Calculation
The 퐶퐼퐴 can report any bias, if the participating nodes have any prior indulgence of declaring each other as cooperative nodes.
It may also unjustifiably declare a node as selfish. So the 퐶퐼퐴 makes this distinction of the selfish and cooperative node.
The watchdog nodes important aspect is its honesty. The honesty of the watchdog node is directly linked to its reputation.
The watchdog node 퐼퐴 important aspect is equivalent to the reputation level over the cumulative reputation level of all the
watchdog nodes in the community. 퐼퐴푥 indicates the importance of the watchdog node and 푅1, 푅2 and 푅3 are three relay-
involved watchdog nodes and is given in equation 9.
퐼퐴푥 =
푅푥
Σ3푥=1푅푥
(9)
If any 푥 node reports the behavior of the any 푛 node, the accurate judgment is considered to be equivalent to the importance
aspect (퐼퐴) of a node reporting the nodes behavior. Therefore, any 푥 node with an important aspect 퐼퐴푥 states that node 푥 is
cooperative and is given in equation 10.
푀푥(퐶표표푝) = 퐼퐴푥 (10)
푀푥(푆푒푙푓 ) = 1 − 퐼퐴푥 (11)
Moreover, If any 푦 node reported 푘 as selfish then
푀푦(푆푒푙푓 ) = 퐼퐴푦 (12)
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푀푦(퐶표표푝) = 1 − 퐼퐴푦 (13)
The evidence from all the nodes will be used to calculate the final honesty level of the node to award payment. The 퐶퐼퐴 rule
decides the behavior of the node as selfish or cooperative. The 퐶퐼퐴 rule state that even if two of the watchdog nodes declare
the node to be selfish, but the total value of trust is less than the third watchdog node that claims the node to be cooperative.
Then according to 퐶퐼퐴 rule, the node will be acknowledged as a cooperative node. The final reputation is calculated from the
awarded payment to the node and current reputation. This is announced by the 퐶퐻 in the network to all.
3.2.2 Watchdog Nodes Payment
Each trustworthy report submitted by the monitoring node gets payment for it. The 퐶퐻 makes payment to the nodes on their
trust value. The final value is the trustworthiness of the monitoring node. For (푃푎푦 > 0), shows that this node is trustworthiness
as the final trust value is matching with trust report. For (푃푎푦 < 0), it shows that the final trust value is different from the trust
value and it termed the node as misbehaving watchdog node. Some slight modification is made to deal with different features
of the participating devices in the community. So the honesty of the node is considered as internal and private to the node. This
is the basic eligibility criteria for the participation in the democratic process. The awarded value of the reputation is the real
number of each node. This value alters as the truth-telling behavior of the nodes changes.
3.2.3 Carry-Forward Reputation
The initial reputation of each node in the network is set to zero. The reputation of the node changes during the election process.
The change made to the reputation value is updated and 퐶퐻 node announces it after every update. The node status changes
to 퐺푊 after every update from the 퐶퐻 node. Every node shares its reputation table 푅푇푎푏푙푒 with community head 퐶퐻 after
each update. The data forwarded by the 퐺푊 node is checked for authentication by the 퐶퐻 before it is broadcasted. This means
that all the information about the reputation is managed and stored by the 퐶퐻 in a community. Let us suppose that there are
three community 푎, 푏 and 푐, and new node 푁 enters in the 푏 community. According to our proposed scheme community, 푏
knows about the reputation values of all the participated nodes in the 푎 and 푐 community. So the community 푎 and 푏 has all the
information about the푁 node even before it enters into 푎 and 푏 community. If 퐶퐻 has no information about the new node, then
this new node will be termed as a new node to the network.
3.3 Penalties for Selfish Nodes
The community head stimulates the selfish nodes in the network for participation in the democratic process. It can also punish
the selfish node with repeated misbehavior in three ways. The 퐶퐻 gives zero incentive to the nodes if it behaves selfishly for
the first time and encourages it to participate. The 퐶퐻 gives negative payment to the node if it shows selfish behavior for the
second time. The 퐶퐻 node can punish the node with repeated selfish behavior and expel it from the network for some time. It
is also noted that the node may join the network after some time and cooperate with the nodes, so such a node should pay the
negative payment first. The penalty coefficient is used as an importance mechanism for feedback. This feature is used to measure
the dishonesty level of the node, which has shown such behavior in the past. It is important to keep the honesty level at a certain
level, so an exponential downgrading system is used. ∣∣ 퐶 ∣∣ shows the total number of conversations at time 푡 and ∣∣ 푈퐶 ∣∣ is
ineffective conversations. The penalty is calculated in equation 14:
퐻푝(푡) =
∣∣ 퐶 ∣∣ − ∣∣ 푈퐶 ∣∣
∣∣ 퐶 ∣∣
푒(
∣∣퐶 ∣∣−∣∣푈퐶 ∣∣
∣∣퐶 ∣∣ ) (14)
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, a simulation tool VDTNSim was used to conduct the simulation performance of HBDS scheme53. VDTNSim
is the extended version of the Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) Simulator54. This makes it possible to simulate the
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TABLE 2 Simulation Parameters
Parameters Values
Simulation Area 4500 × 3500푚2
Number of nodes 100
Transmission Range 300m
Malicious Activity 0% to 80%
Comparison Proposed Scheme compared with SimBet and SSAR
Simulation Time 24 hrs
Number of Relay Nodes 05
Number of Terminal Nodes 100
Terminal Nodes Buffer Capacity 150 MB
Relay Node Buffer Capacity 250 MB
Average Speed 60푘푚∕ℎ
Variation in Nodes 20 to 100
Interval for Packets Generation [20, 30] sec
Node Communication IEEE 802.11b
Size of Packets [50, 650 KB]
Packets TTL 320 minutes
VDTN architectural solution, which involves the store-carry-and forward relayed network just below the network layer. The
Simulation setup, performance metrics, and results are shown in the next subsections.
4.1 SIMULATION SETUP
The simulation takes place in three modules. The first module shows the evaluation of selfish nodes effects on performance
metrics such as packet delivery probability, packet dropping ratio, overhead and delivery delay. Based on our setup the results
for the HBDS protocol are obtained in the second module. In the third module, the results are contrasted and examined with
two existing protocols. Selfish node differences are used as techniques for testing all three protocols. For 0% selfish nodes, the
network is assumed to be normal. The selfish nodes range from 0% to 80% in the network throughout the simulation process.
SSAR is used as a basis for comparison. Table 2 lists the parameters used in the simulation.
4.2 METRICS
The simulation uses packet delivery probability, packet dropping ratio, delivery delay, and overhead ratio as metrics of per-
formance within a network. The probability of packet delivery was computed as the percentage between the number of the
individual packets forwarded to their intended destination and the number of individual packets created at source nodes. The
packet delivery delay for the packet is calculated as the average amount of time packets have to transfer from source to destina-
tion. A nodes in the network dropped packets because there is lesser space in the buffer, TTL expiry is soon and selfish behavior
of the node. The overhead ratio calculates a routing protocols bandwidth performance. It means it has to calculate extra bundles
for necessary delivery that packet. HBDS is compared with incentive-based protocols: SimBet55 and Social selfishness Aware
Routing (SSAR)39. SimBet is used as a basis for comparison.
4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
VCG method has been used to make payments to the nodes. The nodes participating in the democratic process are rewarded
incentives to show collaboration and cooperation in a network. Such cooperative nodes can become Community Head, Auxiliary
Community Head, and Incentive Head via the democratic process. Negative incentives are provided to selfish nodes for not
exhibit the appropriate commitment. The Nodes are also punished in the form of removal from the network if they consistently
exhibit selfish behavior.
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4.3.1 Impact of Selfish Nodes on Performance Metrics
The analysis begins with an evaluation of the influence of selfish nodes on all performance metrics such as packet delivery
ratio, delivery delay, overhead ratio, and number of packet dropped as shown in figure 2. It is observed that the packets delivery
ratio drastically decreases as the number of selfish nodes increases in the network as shown in 2a. This operation shows how
important it is to detect and take steps against such nodes (e.g. punish or exclude them from the network). The selfish behavior of
the nodes also affects the time packets take to reach its destination. It is due to the fact that the selfish nodes are not cooperating
and it takes double effort from the cooperative nodes to deliver the packets to the destination. This process increases the amount
of time a packet has to transfer between its source and the intended destination as shown in figure 2b.
By holding packets on node buffers for a prolonged period of time causes buffer congestion, resulting in a higher proportion of
dropped packets as nodes must maintain their cooperative behavior so as to not deviate from the protocol. In addition to affecting
other nodes, the existence of selfish nodes in the network will also have a massive impact on the routing process. The overhead is
shown in figure 2c that describes the routing protocols bandwidth performance. It can be seen clearly when a number of selfish
nodes increases it also increase the overhead that actually degrades the network performance. figure 2d shows that the number
of packets dropped as a result of the existence of selfish nodes. It was observed throughout this section, as the percentage of
(a) Packet Delivery Probability (b) Packet Delivery Delay
(c) Overhead Ratio (d) Number of Dropped Packets
FIGURE 2 Influence of different number of selfish nodes on Performance Metrics
selfish nodes increased it has drastically affected the performance of all the metrics. In next subsection, the performance of the
proposed HBDS scheme is checked by incorporating the same percentage of selfish nodes in the network.
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4.3.2 Effect of Selfish Nodes on Packet Delivery Ratio and Average Delivery Delay
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, the result of the HBDS scheme was compared with a scheme where there
is no selfishness omitting procedure was used as shown in figure 3. This study begins with an assessment of the percentage of
packets delivered. As shown in figure 3a, as the number of selfish nodes increases, the probability of packet delivery continues
to decrease.
(a) Packet Delivery Probability (b) Number of Dropped Packets
FIGURE 3 Packet Delivery and Delay when 20% to 80% nodes are selfish nodes
However, the HBDS succeeds in reducing the negative effect of selfish nodes. Comparing HBDS packet delivery outcomes
with a strategy in which no action is taken toward selfish nodes. By incorporating 20% selfish nodes in the network, the HBDS
increases the packet delivery outcome by approximately 4%, 4%, 8%, 2%, 2%, 6%, 3%, 3% and 3% (for a number of nodes
20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 respectively). In addition, by incorporating 80% selfish nodes, HBDS also enables to
reduce the effects of selfish nodes by increasing the probability of packet delivery. The packet delivery probability is increased
approximately by 3%, 3%, 3%, 3%, 4%, 3%, 2%, 3% and 7% (for number of nodes 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100
respectively. This is because, HBDS rewards nodes in the form incentive (reputation) for their cooperative behavior, making
cooperative nodes even more resource-sharing.
It can also be seen in figure 3b that HBDS also produces a good performance in terms of packet delivery delay when compared
to a scheme in which there is no strategy used for omitting selfishness in a community. It ensures that HBDS is capable of
delivering packets faster. When 20% selfish nodes are incorporated in the network, the HBDS packets delivery approximately
5, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 6, 6, and 6 sooner (for a number of nodes 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 respectively). Also, when 80%
selfish nodes are incorporated in the network, the HBDS packets delivery approximately 16, 16, 16, 16, 15, 16, 16, 16, and 16
sooner (for number of nodes 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 respectively). The explanation for the observed results for
both parameters is due to the HBDS approach of considering a reputation score of nodes to determine the number of resources
they can share. The node reputation score will be increased by allowing only interaction between cooperative nodes, that is
resulting in higher resource sharing.
4.3.3 Effect of Selfish Nodes on Number of Packets Drops and Overhead Ratio
The performance of the proposed scheme HBDS is checked in terms of wasted resources in this section. The evaluation begins
with an assessment of the overhead ratio and number of packets dropped for this reason as shown in figure 4. It can be seen in
figure 4a, the selfish nodes do not have a huge impact on the overhead ratio in the proposed scheme HBDS.
This is a big achievement when the result of the proposed scheme HBDS is compared with the result of an approach where
no action has been taken toward selfish nodes. For 20% selfish nodes the overhead of HBDS is decreased approximately by 8, 7,
7, 8, 12, 16, 18, 17, and 16 packets (for a number of nodes 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 respectively). Similarly for For
80% selfish nodes, the overhead of the proposed scheme HBDS is reduced approximately by 3, 5, 5, 4, 5, 7, 7, 8, and 6 packets
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(a) Overhead Ratio (b) Number of Dropped Packets
FIGURE 4 Overhead Ratio and Number of Dropped Packets when 20% to 80% nodes are selfish nodes
(for a number of nodes 20 , 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 respectively). The proposed scheme also significantly reduced the
number of packets drops for different percentage of selfish nodes as shown in figure 4b.
For 20% selfish nodes, the HBDS scheme dropping packets approximately 200, 200, 200, 300, 200, 300, 200, 200, and 700
(for a number of nodes 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 respectively) less than the approach where there is no proper selfish
nodes detection procedure used. In addition, for 80% selfish nodes, the proposed scheme discard less 200, 200, 200, 300, 200,
300, 200, 200, and 700 packets (for a number of nodes 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 respectively). This happens because
HBDS helps to reduce the network resource due to the propermonitoring of selfish nodes in the community and avoiding contacts
with such nodes. Thus, avoiding selfish node contact often means that a higher number of copies of packets pass through the
network, improving their chances to reach the final destination.
4.3.4 Comparison of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet for Different Percentage of Selfish Nodes
These three techniques are evaluated for the network characteristics in case of 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% nodes are selfish. The
HBDS scheme outperforms the two schemes SSAR and SimBet in terms of Packet delivery probability, packet delivery delay,
overhead ratio and a number of dropped packets as shown in 5. In figure 5a, the packet delivery probability of the proposed
HBDS scheme is higher.
For 20% selfish nodes, the packet delivery probability of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet is 49%, 35% and 30% respectively that is
14% and 19% higher than SSAR and SimBet. Similarly for 80% selfish nodes, the packet delivery probability of HBDS is 25%
that is 7% and 13% higher than SSAR and SimBet respectively. The key reason behind this is that the HBDS scheme encourages
selfish nodes to take part in the routing process and thus avoid the selfish behavior of nodes. The other three techniques did not
present in-depth the effect of selfishness on the network. In figure 5b, the packet delivery delay, overhead ratio and a number
of packets dropped of the Proposed HBDS scheme are lower. For 20% selfish nodes, the packet delivery delay of HBDS is 110
minutes that is 20% and 27% lower than SSAR and SimBet respectively. By incorporating 80% selfish nodes, the packet delivery
delay of the HBDS is 130 minutes that is 27% and 57% lower than SSAR and SimBet respectively. In figure 5c, the overhead of
HBDS scheme is 25% and 37.5% lower than SSAR and SimBet respectively when there are 20% selfish nodes in the network.
The comparison of HDBS, SSAR, and SimBet for packet delivery ratio for different percentage of selfish nodes is shown in
Table 3. For 20% selfish nodes, the packet delivery probability of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet are 49, 35, and 30 respectively.
Thus, it can be seen that the packet delivery ratio of HBDS is 23% and 31% higher than SSAR and SimBet respectively. In
addition, for 80% selfish nodes, the packet delivery probability of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet are 25, 18, and 12 that is 11.6%
and 21.6% higher than SSAR and SimBet respectively.
The comparison of HDBS, SSAR, and SimBet for delivery delay for different percentage of selfish nodes is shown in Table 4.
For 20% selfish nodes, the delivery delay of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet are 110, 170, and 190 respectively. Thus, it can be seen
that the delivery delay of HBDS is 20% and 27% lower than SSAR and SimBet respectively. In addition, for 80% selfish nodes,
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(a) Packet Delivery Probability (b) Packet Delivery Delay
(c) Overhead Ratio (d) Number of Dropped Packets
FIGURE 5 Performance Comparison of HBDS, SSAR and SimBet for Selfish Nodes Percentage of 20% to 80% for all Metrics
TABLE 3 Comparison of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet in case of 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% Selfish nodes for Packet Delivery
Probability
No. of Selfish Nodes HBDS SSAR SimBet
20% 49 35 30
40% 39 30 25
60% 30 24 18
80% 25 18 12
the delivery delay of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet are 130, 210, and 300 that is 56% and 26% lower than SSAR and SimBet
respectively.
In addition, for 80% selfish nodes, the overhead of proposed scheme is 22% and 37% lower than SSAR and SimBet respectively.
In figure 5d, for 20% selfish nodes, the number of packet drop in HBDS scheme is 7% and 22% less than SSAR and SimBet
respectively. The comparison of HDBS, SSAR, and SimBet for overhead ratio for different percentage of selfish nodes is shown
in Table 5. For 20% selfish nodes, the overhead ratio of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet are 30, 50, and 60 respectively. Thus, it
can be seen that the overhead ratio of HBDS is 25% and 38% lower than SSAR and SimBet respectively. In addition, for 80%
selfish nodes, the overhead of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet are 43, 60, and 72 that is 22% and 37% lower than SSAR and SimBet
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TABLE 4 Comparison of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet in case of 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% Selfish nodes for Delivery Delay
No. of Selfish Nodes HBDS SSAR SimBet
20% 110 170 190
40% 120 190 200
60% 123 200 250
80% 130 210 300
TABLE 5 Comparison of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet in case of 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% Selfish nodes for Overhead Ratio
No. of Selfish Nodes HBDS SSAR SimBet
20% 30 50 60
40% 38 56 65
60% 41 58 67
80% 43 60 72
TABLE 6 Comparison of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet in case of 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% Selfish nodes for Number of Packets
Drop
No. of Selfish Nodes HBDS SSAR SimBet
20% 5300 6000 7500
40% 5700 6500 7700
60% 6300 7000 8000
80% 6700 7500 8500
respectively. The comparison of HDBS, SSAR, and SimBet for packet delivery ratio for different percentage of selfish nodes
is shown in Table 6. For 20% selfish nodes, the rate of packet drop of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet are 5300, 6000, and 7500
respectively. Thus, it can be seen that the overhead ratio of HBDS is 7% and 22% lower than SSAR and SimBet respectively. In
addition, for 80% selfish nodes, the rate of packet drop of HBDS, SSAR, and SimBet are 6700, 7500, and 8500 respectively, that
is 8% and 18% lower than SSAR and SimBet respectively. It is because the nodes avoid sending messages to their neighboring
nodes in other methods, if they do not have a strong social interaction with their neighbors. The nodes are considered to be
cooperative residing in the same community in SimBet and SAAR methods. So in this protocol, the level of selfishness is low.
While the nodes will modify their selfishness accordingly in our HBDS scheme if they have sufficient incentive for data transfer.
This improves network performance by changing the selfishness of the node dynamically. Therefore, it concludes that HBDS
scheme has a better capacity to handle node selfishness and to encourage nodes to collaborate in a better network performance.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this article, the HBDS scheme is proposed for IoT using VDTN to stimulate selfish nodes in a community for cooperation
or forwarding of messages. The HBDS scheme monitors selfish nodes and continuously watches their behavior. The reward
is offered as a reputation that makes the network node cooperative. Nodes are also penalized for showing consistently self-
ish behavior. Following the democratic process, the watchdog nodes evaluate the performance of their neighbor nodes. Two
protocols namely SSAR and SimBet were systematically analyzed to test the performance metrics such as packet delivery prob-
ability, packet delivery delay, overhead ratio and number of dropped packets. The results show that the HBDS scheme can
effectively manage a wide range of selfish nodes by enabling more selfish nodes to work together in a community to boost
network performance.
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The proposed scheme HBDS can be used in the future for cooperative sharing of the information among the connected nodes
in the network. It can be used for efficient tracking of the selfish nodes to detect the network anomalies like errors in packets
delivery, damaged packets delivered, energy and power constraints.
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